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ABSTRACT
In a recent paper, Canzoneri, Henderson, and Rogoff have shown that it is
possible for the monetary authority to peg the nominal interest rate without
creating price level indeterminacy in a simplified version of the 1975
Sargent—Wallace model. The present paper begins by reviewing that result, which
involves a limiting case of a money supply rule that depicts the authority as
responding to current values of the interest rate. Then it shows that there
exists an alternative rule that will peg the nominal rate without creating inde-
terminacy, but that this rule induces a different pattern of price level fluc-
tuations. Next the paper considers whether indeterminacy will prevail if the
authority tries to effect a peg in a third way: by simply standing ready to buy
and sell securities at the desired rate. Finally, the implication of the
foregoing results are drawn for arguments concerning the real bills doctrine and
some critical comments are directed at the recent attempted rehabilitationof





Pittsburgh, PA 15213I. Introduction
In one of the more famous papers of the past decade, Sargent and
Wallace (1975) argued that the price level and other nominal magnitudes
1/
will be formally indeterminate in a flexible-price economy free of money
illusion and expectational irrationality if the monetary authority tries
to use an interest rate as its policy instrument, that is, adopts a policy
feedback rule that sets each period's interest rate as a fixed function of
previous realizations of relevant variables. A few years later Parkin (1978)
and McCallum (1981) showed that an interest rate feedback rule would not
lead to nominal indeterminacy in such economies if the rule was designed to
have some specified effect on the quantity of money (or the price level) in
an upcoming period. Indeterminacy would be avoided if the monetary authority's
objective function involved some nominal magnitude, a conclusion reminiscent
of Patinkin's (1965, p. 309) dictum that "a necessary condition for the
determinacy of the absolute price level ...isthat the central bank concern
itself with some money value--and in this sense be willing to suffer from
money illusion." This contention would appear to be correct for any economy
in which private agents' behavior is concerned only with real magnitudes,
for without "money illusion" on the part of the monetary authority no nominal
variable will enter the system in any way.
Given these arguments, a result recently developed by Canzoneri, Henderson,
and Rogoff (1983) is of considerable interest, for it indicates that the
interest rate can be
virt,11y
pegged at an arbitraryvalue in an economy of
the Sargent-Wallace type.This result is considerably stronger than that
in the McCallum (1981) demonstration, it should be noted, as the latter does flOL
pertainto cases in which parameters of the interest rate feedback rule are
autonomous (i.e., unrelated to behavioral characteristics of the private economy).2
Furthermore, a pegged interest rate would appear to violate Patinkin's
dictum, despite the latter's apparent reasonableness. But becausetheir
main concern is with other matters, Canzoneri, Henderson, andRogoff--
henceforth, CHR--do not devote much space or emphasis to their result.
Nor do they contrast their own reasoning with that ofprevious writers.
The first object of the present paper, accordingly, is toprovide an
alternative development of the CHR result, one that facilitatescomparison
with other analyses.
Furthermore, CHR do not investigate the possibility that the interest
rate can be pegged by policy schemes other than themonetary rule
used in their discussion. The second object of thepresent paper is
then to consider some alternative schemes. Particularattention is accorded
the question of whether nominal indeterminacyobtains--or, in what sense it
obtains--if the monetary authority attempts topeg the interest rate not by
an Qxtreme versionof a money supply rule, as in the dR setup, but by
simply standing ready to buy or sell securities at the rate inquestion.
In the course of addressing this issue, it will becomenecessary to consider
what empirical interpretation should be given to a situationinvolving
nominal indeterminacy.
Finally, a third objective of the paper is to consider the implications
of the pegging results for two topics ofgreat importance in the development
of monetary thought--Wicksell's cumulativeprocess and the so-called real
bills doctrine. Particular attention is devoted, in thisportion of the paper,
to the recent reconsideration of the real bills doctrineprovided by
Sargent and Wallace (1982).
Before beginning the analysis, one possible source of confusionshould
be addressed. In considering the various issues ofconcern in this paper,3
it is important to distinguish clearly between price level indeterminacy
and nonunigueness (or multiplicity) of price level solutions. The former,
discussed by Patinkin (1961), Sargent-Wallace (1975), and McCallum (1981),
involves situations in which the model economy (including specifications
of policy behavior) does not determine the value of !nominalmagnitude.
By constrast, the latter--discussed by Sargent and Wallace (1973), Taylor
(1977), McCallum (1983a), and many others--involves situations in which many
price level solution paths satisfy the model for each given path of the
money stock. Thus indeterminacy pertains to all nominal values but no real
3/
values, while nonuniqueness involves multiple paths of real money balances.4
II. Basic Result
In order to facilitate comparison with previous literature and provide
a maximum of simplicity, we shall begin the discussion in the context of
the two-equation, full-employment IS-LN model used by NcCallum (1981).
Letting r denote the nominal rate of interest withm and Pt logs of the
money stock and price level, respectively, this model can be written as:
(1) r =b0+ Etpt÷l -Pt+ v b0 > 0
(2) m -Pt
=
c0+ c1r + C0 > O,c < 0.
Here v and are independent white noise disturbances while
Etpt+l = 1 with -1denotingrealizations of all variables
in periods t-1, t-2 Equations (1) and (2) can be thought of as IS
and LM functions, respectively; i.e., relationships describing saving!
4/
investment and portfolio balance behavior by the private sector.
In this setting, the basic idea of the CHR result can be exhibited
quite simply. To do so, let us initially suppose that the monetary
authority adopts a money supply rule of the following form:
(3) m =+1t + A.(r -r) X > 0
From this specification it is clear that it is being assumed that the monetary
authority can observe the interest rate for a given period when setting the
value of the money supply for that period. It is also clear that the type
of policy behavior in question involves a growth rate of money thatequals p
on average but differs front that value if the current interest rate departs
from its desired value r. The greater the concern with the closeness ofr to
r, the larger will be the magnitude of X.5
Inobtaining a solution to the model, we wish to exclude "bubble" or
"bootstrap" components--i.e., components that exist only because they are
arbitrarily expected to exist. One possible reason for excluding bubbles
is belief in the substantive hypothesis that they typically do not exist
as an empirical matter. Another reason, sufficient for the purposes of
this paper, is that the admission of bubble components would lead to a
5/
multiplicity of solutions.As stated above, we wish clearly to distinguish
such multiplicities from indeterminacies. Furthermore, such multiplicities
make difficult the comparison of outcomes under alternative policies.
Consequently, we shall utilize the minimal-state-variable approach,
described in NcCallum (1983a), which leads to the exclusion of bubble
components.
Inspection of the system (l),(2),(3) suggests that the essential relevant
6/
statevariables are t,v,and .Consequently,reduced-form "solution"
equations for Pt and r will be of the form
(4) Pt =lO+ + rT12Vt+ l3t
(5) r =IT20
+ ¶121t + + 23t
Now the first of these implies that expectations are generated according to
(6) ='lO+
Consequently, substitution of (4), (5), and (6) into (1) yields
(7)IT20 + 1T21t + IT22V+TT23T1t =b0+ IT10 + 1T11(t+l)
10 + IT11t+ ITi2Vt+ IT13) +
whichimpliesthe following relationships between the undetermined co-















IT10 + Ti11t+ IT12v+ 1T1311 + c0 + c1(7120 +1r21t+ + Ti23fl+
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Finally,solving equations (8) and (10) we obtain
(11) lO =0
-






+ A -c1) 22 =11(1+ X-
c1)
=-11(1+A-
c1) 1123 =1/(1+ A -c1)
From the expressions for2O and we then conclude that--as is obvious
for this classical model--a choice ofl =r-
b0is necessary to make the
mean value of r equal the target value r. If that choice is made, however,
r will fluctuate randomly around r. And by increasing the magnitude of A,
the values of 22 and23 can be driven arbitrarily close to zero so the7
behavior of r can be made arbitrarily close to r =r,i.e., to the
desired peg. Furthermore, the price level parameters are well defined,
even as X—co.Inparticular, in the limit we have and
so that
(12) Pt =- c0
-
c1r+ + Vt.
Thusthere is no indeterminacy of p even in this extreme case. This is,
t
7/
in the present model, the result obtained by CHR.8
III. An Alternative Policy Rule
In a non-stochastic setting, a constant money growth rate of value
can, of course, be expressed by =m1+aswell as bym =+
Thatleads naturally to the question of whether the followingmoney supply
rule will have the same effects onr and Pt as (3):
(13) m =mi+ +X(r-
Now,in the system (l),(2), (13) the relevant set of state variables includes
instead of tsowe posit solutions of the form
(14) Pt = +
rr11m ÷ 1112v+
(15)r =2O+ TT2im1+1122V +
The implied expectation in this case is
(16) Etpl = +ii[m1+ l + + + 22Vt+23t
-
Substitutioninto (1) then yields an equation analogous to (7) whichimplies









X•r111)1•T22 = 12+ 1
(1 -1l'23
In addition, substitution into (2) implies













In this case there are two sets of solutions, one in which the second of equati'
(17)-(18) are satisfied by i-r=l/Xand the other in which =0
and rr11 =1.By means of the procedure described in McCallum (1983a, pp.146-7)
it can be determined that the second set provides the minimal-state-variable,


















From these, we see that rt fluctuates randomly about r. But we also see
that the coefficients 22 and 23 do not; approach zero as X-4'o. On the
other hand, and iT13 approach as.Sowith the non-stationary
version of the money supply rule, responding more strongly to current
deviations of r from r serves to increase (without bound) the variance of
t 8/9/
Pt and has noeffecton the variance of r.
These last conclusions should not, however, be given much weight for
they are not robust to specificational adjustments in the model. Suppose,
in particular, that output is not strictly constant but instead departs from
a (constant) capacity value in response to a price level surprise term,
Pt -EP1c asit does in the CHR (1983) specification. Then the
appropriate modification of equations (1) and (2) would be as follows:
(1') rt =b0+ Ep÷i Pt + b1(p -Eptlt_l)+ Vt
(2')m -p
=
c0+ c1r + c2(p -EptlQt_l)+
Here b1 < 0 and c2 > 0.10
Re-solving the model with these changes leads to no alteration in the
solution values for
IT10, IT11 IT2o or but for the remaining coefficients
we have
(20) IT12 =(X-c1)/1 IT22 =(1+c2)/1
IT13
=- l)(1i '23 =(1-
b1)/$1
where =- X)(l+c2)+ (X -c1)(l
-
b1).Consequently, we see that
as we obtain rr22—0 and rT2340 unless by chance
c2 -b1.
Furthermore, with the same proviso, we see that
II12.........-1/(b1 +c2)
and
+c2),so that the variance ofPt does not increase without
bound. The behavior of the system is in these two ways the same as in
10/
Section II, with the money supply rule (3).
An important difference can benoted,however, when we reconsider the
present model in light of the money supply rule of Section Il--i.e., when
we consider the system (1'), (2'), (3).Again the values of
IT11
and IT21 are unchanged but for the other coefficients we obtain
(21) IT12 =- c1)/$2 =(1+
1113_l/2 1123 =(1-b1)/2
where '2 =(1+c2)+ (X -c1)(]
-
b1).Continuing now with or without the
presumption that c2-b1, we again find that IT2._0 and IT23>0as
But instead of the limiting values in the previous paragraph we now have
-b11113>0. Thus with the extended modeL (1'), (2'), we
see that the limiting behavior of the price level is described by













'whenthe rule is (13). Thus, even with a complete peg of rt enforced by
X—), the stochastic behavior of p (as well as is different under
the two rules. It is then evidently not a complete description of monetary
11/
policy to say that the interest rate will be pegged at r =12
IV.A "Pure"Interest Rate Peg?
Given the conclusion of the last paragraph, it then becomes natural
to ask whether it is possible for the monetary authority to peg r at the
value r, not by means of a money supply rule, but by simply standing
ready to buy or sell securities at the chosen value. The distinction
between this "pure" type of pegging operation and the ones previously
considered is that, while the others involve money supply behavior, in the
present case the money stock is entirely demand determined at the pegged
value of the interest rate. The monetary authority is committed, under
this type of policy, to maintaining a constant interest rate regardless
of the path of rn that materializes.
Analytically, this type of pure peg is expressed by the simple condition
(24)r =r.
Consequently, the system under discussion becomes (1'), (2'), (24), and the
12/
variables to be solved for arePt and m, rather than Pt and r.
Inspection of equations (1'), (2'), and (24) shows that no lagged variables
or trends appear explicitly, so it appears that the relevant set of state
13/
variables includes only v and Thistentative assumption also reflects
the notion that nothing from the past is relevant to the determination of
Pt in a flexible-price model of the type at hand when the monetary authority
does not provide a connection between successive periods by its adopted
14/
policy.
We provisionally assume, then, that solution equations will be of the
form
(25) Pt =lO+II12v + l3't
(26) 't
=3O+TT•32Vt +33t13
Continuing as before, we next note that Etpt÷l = sosubstitution of
that condition plus (24), (25), and (26) into (1') yields
(27) r =b0+ ir -(TT + + l3t ÷bi(rr12vt+ l3t +








Likewise, substitution into (2') yields
(29) 30 + T1•32V + 33t =10
+ l2't + 1T13T1 +
+ c1r + c2(TTi2v + +
imp lying




+ c2) + 1.
Now from (28) and (30) we readily deduce that
'12 =17(1-
b1),'13 =0,1132 =(1+ c2)I(l -b1),
and 1133 =1.But
these equations fail to determine values for either or 113o.
Furthermore, they require--for the avoidance of inconsistency--that the
15 /
pegvalue r be chosen to equal the "natural rate" value b0.Consequently,
in this case we find an apparent nominal indeterminacy with precisely the
sort of symptoms as described in McCallum (1981, pp. 323-4).
Reflection upon the last-mentioned symptom leads one, however, to
consider the possibility that the previous analysis has been attempted
with a sub-minimal set of state variables. The idea is that rational agents,14
being aware of the classical structure of the economy, will understand that
for the policy objectiver =rto be achieved in all future periods it
will be necessary for the inflation rate to equal r -b0on average.
Furthermore, these rational agents will also know that this magnitude of
inflation will necessitate an average money stock growth rate of r -b0.
But money stock growth rates involve comparisons of successive values of
m. Thus a relevant determinant of any m value must be mi. In other
words, m1 appearsto be a relevant state variable when policy is
16/
specified as in (24).
To investigate this conjecture, let us then consider solutions to (1'),
(2'), (24) of the form
(31)Pt lO + 11m_1 + + l3t
(32)m = +
1r31m 1 + 32h1t + ir3311.
To solve the system in this case, we first note that withr =rthere is
no information concerning v or available to private agents during
period t. Thus the expectational variable in (1) becomes
(33)Ep÷1 ='lO+ 'll3O + 31m_i).
Substitution into (1') then yields
(34) r =












Also, substitution into (2) gives





(37) 1130 = +c0 + c1r
11311111
1132 =(1+c2)"12
1133= (1+ c2) 1113 + 1.





and 1133 =1.Also, it is
apparent that rr11 and 1131 both equal 0 or 1. With the former value, the
system would be identical to the one based on (25) and (26), so we take the
values 1111 =
1131
=1.Then from the first of equations (35) wefindthat
1130 =r-
b0






Thus the solution with m1 included as a state variable is well behaved;
it involves no inconsistency or inability to solve for particular parameters.
This result seems to suggest that a pure pegging policy is feasible,
a conclusion that is more drastic than the CHR result that money supply
rules can be designed to maintain a constant interest rate. Before accepting
this conclusion, however, we need to consider whether a different solution
would be obtained if the private agents in our economy behaved as if t,
rather than m1 were the relevant state variable missing from (25) and
(26). That this possibility needs to be examined is indicated by the
contrasting results obtained in Section III under the alternative money
stock rules (3) and (13).16
Accordingly, we now seek solutions to the model (1'), (2'), (24) of
the form
(38)Pt l0 + ll + lZt + 13t
(39)m =30+ rr31t ÷ TT32V + 33t'
where the trend variable t appears rather than mci. In this case,
Etpt+i =lO+ ir11(t + 1) and proceeding as before we find that the








Also, substitution into (2t)leadsto
(41) '3O = +
c0 + c1r
31 =l1
32 =(1+ c2) 'l2
33 =(1+ c2) 'l3 +
From these we see that p12' 13' 22' and IT23 are the same as in the previous
example. We also see, however, that TT =
IT31
=r-
b0and that the system
fails to determine IT10 or IT30.
At a superficial level, one might be inclined to interpret the non-
determination of 1T]M and IT30 as an indication that this solution is not
viable, leaving the solution with the mi state variable as the only well-
behaved candidate. But that conclusion would be unjustified. No parameters17
are undetermined in the mi solution precisely because the previous period's
value of m enters the solution equation. But some value of mi must be
used as an initial value to start up the process, and that value is just
as undetermined as is 3O in the solution with the time trend. In each
case, one initial condition is needed to put the system in operation. Thus
the solution with reduced-form equations of the form (38)-(39) is just as
worthya candidate for selection as "the solution" as is the one with
reduced-form equations of the form (3l)-(32). The conjecture that
mustbe a relevant state variable is incorrect; the trend variable t would
serve as well.
But the solutions with m_1 and t included are different in their implied
time series properties for m and p. In particular, one of these solutions
describes the behavior of m as a random walk with drift r -b0,
while the
other implies that m is generated by a process that departs in a white-noise
t 17/
fashion from a linear trend path with slope r -b0.
So while it is true
that rational agents should be able to infer that r =rrequires an average
money stock growth rate of r -b0,
there is no way for them to infer whether
this average rate is generated in a random-walk or trend-stationary fashion.
And of course these different processes for m correspond to different
processes with the same qualitative characteristics for pr__and, consequently,
to different expectations of future values of p.
The main implication of this finding is that a commitment by the monetary
authority to peg rt at the value r is not a satisfactory description
of policy behavior. In particular, it does not indicate whether or not the
authority will permit "base drift" and is therefore not complete enough to
enable private agents to form expectations--themselves crucial for asset demand
behavior--in a rational manner. A "pure interest rate peg" does not, in18
other words, constitute a well-formulated monetary policy. While the
monetary authority can come arbitrarily close to effecting a pegof the
form r =r,it must do so by adopting a money supply rule such as (3)
or(13) and by making .largein magnitude--not by attempting a pure peg.
This conclusion expresses in a new way the old idea that attempts to peg
interestratesmay be misguided.
It should also be noted, before moving to other matters, that the
solutions in this section provide something akin to counterexamples to the
indeterminacy proposition of Sargent and Wallace (1975). An even clearer
case can be developed, moreover, by use cf an intaras trateruJ..e f the
im_i.
The resulting solution would provide a counterexample in
the sense that Pt would be determinate with a fixed and autonomous feedback
rule for r provided that an initial condition is available for mci. But
without such an initial condition one component of the model--the policy
rule--would not be well-specifie& Thus the Sargent-wallace (1975, p. 250)
discussion goes astray by considering only terminal conditions, as opposed
to initial conditions, as possible ways of pinning down nominal magnitudes.
In addition, the foregoing discussion suggests a more detailed
interpretation of indeterminacy findings in static, non-stochastic models
such as those used by Gurley and Shaw (1960), Patinkin (1961) (1965, pp. 308-9),
Sargent (1979, pp. 92-5), and Fischer (1983). In particular, one can see
that to restrict the analysis to the fully static case with zero inflation
is tantamont to adoption of a solution form like (25) (26). But that seems
overly restrictive; admission of non-zero inflation rates would seem desirable
even in a non-stochastic framework and such an admission would eliminate
certain inconsistencies. There would be a remaining indeterminacy corresponding
to the need for an initial condition to go with our equations (35) (37) or19
(40) (41). But this hardly seems to be a matter of great consequence
since the choice of an initial value for m has no effect on any real
magnitude, not even real money balances. Thus traditional findings of
nominal indeterminacy seem to point Out inadequacies of the assumptions
utilized, rather than the policies investigated.
Our main result indicates, however, that there is a valid criticism to
be made of interest rate pegging policies of the pure type. This criticism
is based on the different time series properties of solutions for nominal
variables that are consistent with the model when stochastic elements are
recognized. These differing solutions indicate that pure pegging--a standing
offer to buy and sell securities at a specified interest rate--does not
constitute a well-formulated monetary policy.20
V.Indeterminacy and the Real Bills Doctrine
An interesting and important interpretationof a pegged interest rate
is as a manifestation of policy behaviorof the type recommended by the
19/
ancient and infamous "real bills doctrine."
This interpretation has been
expressed by a number of writers, including Patinkjn
(1965, P. 309),
20/
Humphrey (1982), Sargent (1979, pp. 92-5), andSargent and Wallace (1975).
Price level indeterminacy is viewed, underthis interpretation, asillustrating
in an extreme fashion the
undesirability of a policy regime of the real-
bills type.
n a provoca va rnabt Sargent andWalLace (1982) havt recently
attempted to provide "something of a rehabilitationof the real bills doctrine"
(1982, p. 1214). In developing thisnew position, these authors (henceforth,
S-W) construct an overlapping generations modelin which Pareto optimality
obtainsunder a policyregimeof the real-bills type, but doesnot obtain
21/ under a regime of the "quantitytheory" type.A subsidiary but crucial
strand of the argument focuseson the issue of price level determinacy.
In this regard, s-windicatethat theprice level isdeterminate in their
1982 model under thereal bills regime even though the latterfeatures an
interestrate pegged at thevalue zero.
Elsewhere,Sargent (1982) hascontrasted this finding with the
indeterminacy result in the earlier (1975) S-Wpaper. Indeed, Sargent has
(1982, p. 387) conjectured that "the differencein these two analyses stems
sensitively from the fact that the older one tookthe demand function for
money and a particular definition of money asprimitive objects, while the
laterpaper goes deeperand has primitive objects in the formof preferences,
opportunities, endowments,and explicit restrictions on financialintermediation21
One purpose of the present section is to investigate this conjecture;
another aim is to comment more generally on the S-W rehabilitation of the
real bills doctrine.
We begin by reviewing aspects of the S-W (1982) analysis, adopting
notation related (but not identical) to theirs. Under all of the policy
regiMes considered, the price level P(t) is required to satisfy the
following condition in each period, t =1,2,...:
Nh (42) hlt(t) -wh(t÷l)/(l+ rh(t))]/2= H(t)/P(t).
h 22/
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twhile r"(t)isthe real rate of return available between .t an4 t+l to
agent h (h=1,. ..,N).Also, H(t) is the aggregate nominal stock of currency
held by the current old in period t after transfers from, and loan repayments
23 /
to,the government.The term iii square brackets is, given the symmetric Cobb-
Douglas utility function used by S-W, the utility-maximizing quantity of
24/
real savings in period t by member h of generation t.Thus (42) equates
the aggregate saving of each period's young to the aggregate dissaving of its
25/
old, with the latter supplying their money balances (currency) inelastically.
After rationalizing the foregoing type of saving behavior and assuming
that currency and private loans are the only available stores o1f value,
26/
S-W go on to discuss monetary equilibriaunder three different policy
regimes--arrangements that involve "laissez faire" (LF), "quantity theory"
(QT), and "real-bills discount window" (DW) modes of behavior by the monetary
authority. Under the LF regime, all individuals face the same intertemporal
terms of trade so rh(t) =r(t)for all h. Also, equilization of returns on
27/
currency and private securitiesrequires that
(43) r(t) =[P(t)/P(t+l)1
-1.22
Inthis regime, moreover, there re no loans to the young and the monetary
authority holds constant the stock of currency:
(44) H(t) =II.
Together, as S-W show, equations (42), (43), and (44) determine solution
sequences for the variables H(t), P(t), and r(t).
Turning now to the real-bills DW regime, conditions (42) and (43)
28 /
continueto hold.The monetary authority's behavior, however, is in this
case designed to peg the interest rate on private securities at zero:
"thegovernment stands ready atevery date to grantsafe one-period loans
in the form of (newly printed)government currency at a zero nominal rate
ofinterest" (S-W, 1982, p. 1225). But that mode of behavior is expressed
analyticallyas
(45) r(t) +P(t+1)-P(t)=
whichthen replaces (44) as the formal representation of policy. And (45)
is algebraically equivalent to (43), so the DW system includes only two
independent equations, a number that is inadequate to determine values for
the three variables H(t), P(t), and r(t). Only r(t) and the ratio H(t)/P(t)
can be found from analysis of the model.
The contrary conclusion that there is no indeterminacy problem is reached
by S-W (1982, p. 1226) because they treat H(t) as a constant for all t =1,2...
and take that constant value as exogenously given. But since in their model
H(t) is the currency stock held by the old in taftertransfers, should the
government choose to make any, the value of H(t) in the initial period t=l is
not independent of the choice of the monetary authority. The objective of a
zero magnitude for r(t) + 1 -P(t)/P(t+l)is inadequate, given private agents'23
concern for real magnitudes, to determine what constant value of H(t) will
prevail in period 1 and thereafter. What the S-W (1982) example shows, then,
is that it is feasible in. their (non-stochastic) model for the monetary
authority both to peg the interest rate at zero and to hold the money stock
constant at an arbitrarily chosen value. Given the latter value the price
29/
level is determined; without such a value it will not be.
But this essentially duplicates in a non-stochastic setting the
result described in previous sections as pertaining to the 1975 S-W model,
in which it is possible to maintain a constant interest rate and a money
stock that is constant except for random (white noise) fluctuations,
provided that r =b0.The random fluctuations in the money stock are not
present in the S-W (1982) model because it is non-stochastic in specification,
and a constant money stock is compatible with a zero nominal rate of interest
because that rate is required by (43) as a necessary condition of a monetary
equilibrium.
Thus we see that there is no significant difference, with respect to
the indeterminacy status of the two S-W models, to attribute to the fact
that the earlier analysis took demand functions as primitive analytical
objects. As Patinkin's dictum would suggest, the relevant distinction as
far as potential indeterminacy is concerned is whether the demand functions
(primitive or derived) are free of money illusion.
A more interesting issue, of course, is whether the 1982 S-W analysis
in fact provides any support for the real bills doctrine. In that regard
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there are two points that need to be made here, both of which suggest
that such support is not provided by the analysis in question. First, as
we have seen, the S-W (1982) model is one in which price level determinacy
requires that the monetary authority specify a value for H(l), the initial24
money stock. But the need for any such quantitative specificationis
precisely what is denied by the real bills doctrine in its claimthat a
restriction of loans to discounts of real bills is sufficient to guarantee
31/
desirable monetary behavior.
Second, and of greater import, is the fact that the S-W (1982) model
is one in which the asset termed ttcurrency" serves as a store of value
32/
but not as a medium of exchange.This fact is crucial in evaluating the
main theme of the S-W argument, namely, that Pareto-optimality obtains
under the real bills DW regime even though the resulting equilibrium
features a relatively large extent of price level variability. With
respect to that theme, Laidler (1984) has suggested that the S-W analysis
is inconsistent with the views of the doctrine's 18th and 19th century
advocates, who ...regardedthe maintenance of price level stability as
a vital principle of social organization, and would not have entertained
a defense of their doctrine which showed that it failed to ensure such
stability" (Laidler, 1984, p. ).Now,while this suggestion of Laidler's
would certainly appear to be correct, the substantive issue of whether
a real bills regime is socially desirable does not hinge on what its
original proponents believed. If the S-W model were one that satisfactorily
depicted the essential features of a contemporary economy, then their
results would be of importance regardless of the views of Adam Smith,
Thomas Tooke, John Fullerton, et. al.
As it happens, however, the S-W (1982) model does not provide an
adequate vehicle for analysis of a contemporary monetary economy. Laidler
mentions the model's neglect of uncertainty and production, but not its
most fundamental weakness: the asset called "currency" does not serve
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asa medium of exchange.That being the case, there is no reason to25
think of this asset as money--it would be better thought of as government
14/
bonds--andthus no reason to think of the reciprocal of its price in terms
of goods as "the price level." Nor is there any reason to think of the
model's financial intermediaries as "banks"--i.e., as intermediaries with
liabilities that serve as money--or to think of the government's loan
office as a central bank. What S-W call the price level is just the
price of goods relative to the price of government bonds, and the fact
that its value fluctuates in the LF and DW regimes is merely the
reflection of assumptions regarding tastes and endowments that directly
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necessitate fluctuations in the real rate of interest.
Thus the S-W (1982) model is, as a consequence of its design, one
that is incapable of addressing issues concerning the real bills doctrine.
As I have argued elsewhere (1983b)(l983c), the specific feature that makes
this model inapplicable to various monetary issues is not its life-cycle
structure, but its adherence to a particular version of the "principle of
finance theory that assets are valued according to the streams of returns
that back them" (S-W, 1982, p. 1214). There is nothing wrong with that
principle as stated, except for some ambiguity involving the term
"backthem," but S-W have for some reason interpreted it to mean that only
pecuniary returns should be counted. In particular, the transactions-
facilitatingservices of money are not to be counted, a proviso that seems
analogous to requiring that the pleasures of owning a painting by (say)
Vermeer must not be taken into account in the analysis of that asset's
value. As a result of that proviso, every asset in the model must have
the same monetary status--all serve as media of exchange or none do.
Thus it becomes impossible to carry out any analysis that involves a
distinction between money and non-monetary paper assets, a distinction
that is central to thevery notion of the "discounting of real bills."26
VI. The Wicksellian Dynamic Process
A notable feature of the analysis in Sections Il-tV is its evident
inconsistency with the Wickselliari notion that policy designed to yield
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a low nominal rate of interest will tend to induce inflation. In the
analysis of those sections, by contrast, the average rate of inflation
moves (across policy regimes) together with the target value of the nominal
rate. Indeed, extremely low values of r--values below the rate b0--are
associated with falling prices, deflations of magnitude b0 -r.We need
to consider, then, whether the Wicksellian notion is itself incorrect as
a matter of neoclassical theory or if, alternatively, there is some
deficiency in the model (l')-(2') as a vehicle for expressing that theory.
The most prominent way in which our analysis differs from that of
previous Wicksellian discussions--e.g., Wicksell (1898)(1905), Friedman (1968),
Laidler (l972)-—is in its assumption that expectations are formed rationally.
But given the attractiveness of that assumption, recognition of this
difference does not suggest a deficiency in our framework. It leads, rather,
only to a re-phrasing of the question, which now becomes: Is the Wicksellian
notion incorrect for an economy with rational expectations?
The first thing to be said in this regard is that it does appear in-
correct to suggest--as Friedman (1968, p. 5) comes very close to doing--that
the monetary authority cannot permanently keep the nominal interest rate
low or high, as it chooses, by means of low or high rates of money creation.
Ironically, Friedman's hypothesis concerning the natural rate of unemployment
seems more convincing today than the interest rate counterpart that he used
as a relatively uncontroversial means of introduction.27
The second point to be mentioned concerns pegging of the real rate,
r _(EPt÷i - Inthis regard, reflection indicates that the real rate
cannot--in the model (l'),(2')--be maintained at any value differing from
the natural rate value b0; any attempt to do so would founder on an inconsistency
similar to the one noted in Section IV (just below equations (30)). But that
conclusion is not robust to plausible specificational adjustments. In
particular, the inclusion of a real balance effect in (1') would, as is well
known, make the steady-state real rate dependent upon the inflation rate.
So in an economy in which the real balance effect is operative, the monetary
authority can permanently influence the real rate by its money creation activity.
It cannot literally peg the real rate under the informational assumptions
employed in Sections II-IV, because it cannot observe without error the
contemporaneous value of private agents' expected inflation rate. But by





andsetting appropriately, the monetary authority can induce the real rate
to fluctuate randomly around the chosen value p. In this case, lower values of
p will require larger values of and will be associated with higher inflation
rates. This association of high inflation rates and low real rates of interest
is reminiscent of the Wicksellian notion, and indeed might be regarded as a
reformulated version of the latter. It should be recognized, however, that the
phenomena responsible for this association--in particular, the real balance
effect--are quite different from those involved in the original version of the
Wicksellian notion.28
Returning now to the matter of nominal-rate pegging, let us conclude
with a recognition that there is one type of potential malfunction that has
not been explicitly considered in the foregoing discussion--namely, dynamic
instability. It is certainly arguable that dynamic instability would represent
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Wicksell's hypothesis more accurately than the situation of nominal indeterminacy.
For instability to obtain, it is clear that the model at hand would have to be
modified in ways that introduce a more interesting dynamic structure. In this
respect there are two reasonably attractive possibilities. The first of these
would involve replacement of the classical supply function utilized in
Sections II-IV with one that makes prices somewhat sticky, i.e., temporarily
rigid. To maintain consistency with neoclassical theory the adopted supply
function should, however, respect the natural rate hypothesis as applied to
employment and output--something that naive Phillips Curve relationshipsand
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NAIRTJ specifications fail to do. The second type of dynamic modification
that seems of potential interest is one that reflects some sort of lag in
the reaction of policy to rt observations. In this case the policy rule (13)
might, for example, be replaced by
(47)m =m1++ X(r1
-r).
Investigation of such dynamic elaborations is, however, a large task that is
beyond the scope of the present paper.29
VII. Conclusions
The conclusions of our various investigations can be stated very
briefly. First, it is possible—-as Canzoneri, Henderson, and Rogoff
(1983) have shown--for the monetary authority to peg the nominal interest
rate without generating price level indeterminacy in an economy with
rational expectations and no private-sector money illusion. But, second,
this can be accomplished by adhering to either of two (or more) alternative
policy rules, and these have differing implications for the stochastic
behavior of the price level. Third, the feasibility of effecting a pure
peg is more problematical; merely standing ready to buy and sell securities
at the desired rate does not constitute a well-specified policy and so
leaves private agents unable to formulate expectations rationally. Fourth,
the Sargent-wallace (1982) analysis of the real bills doctrine is conducted
in a model that features indeterminacy to the same extent as their 1975
model. Fifth, the mora recent Sargent-wallace model provides an
unsatisfactory framework for consideration of the real bills doctrine
because it neglects the medium-of-exchange role of money, thereby negating
the possibility of distinguishing between monetary and non-monetary paper
assets. Finally, the combination of flexible prices and rational expectations
is not favorable to the Wicksellian idea that low nominal interest rates tend
to induce inflation.Appendix A
The object here is to show by means of a familiar example that the
inclusion of extraneous state variables, i.e., ones not included in the
minimal set, can lead to an infinite multiplicity of solutions. For
this purpose, consider the model (l)(2) with a constant money stock,
=m.Substitution of (1) into (2) then yields
(A-l) m -Pt
=
c3+ ci(Ep÷i - +
where c3 =c0
+ c1b0 and U=+c1v. The minimal-state-variable solution
is of the form
(A-2) + rr1u
and straightforward calculations show that IT0 =m-
c3
and =-11(1-c1).
Suppose, however, that one seeks a solution of the form
(A-3) Pt =IT0+ Ir1u + IT2pt_l + .rr3U1,




1T2(ffo+TTiu MT2pt i+r13ui) + IT3Ut
and substitution into (A-i) gives rise to the implications
(A-5) m =
c3+ crT2TT + IT0
0=
c1ir2r1




The third of these implies that 112 equals zero or (c1-l)/c1. If theformer value is chosen, the minimal-state-variable solution is obtained.
But if the value IT2 =(c1-l)/c1is used, then the equations re
consistent with any value for ¶T1. So the analyst concludes, unless side
conditions are brought in, that there is an infinity of solution paths
for Pt.Appendix B
To show that the minimal-state-variable solution to the system (l)(2)
(13) is as asserted in Section III, consider a more general version of (13)
in which the coefficient on m1 is not necessarily 1.0:
(B-i) m =m1++ X(r-r).
With this modification, the second of equations (17) and (18) become
(B-2) (l-X11)21 =
(B-3) + (X-c1) 2l IT11.
consequently,flj1 is determined as
- - ________
IT11— 2X
where 6 =1+ 'X -(X-c1)Cy-l). But in the case with '= 0the minimal-
state-variable solution will have ¶111 =0,so we see that the negative
square root in (B-4) gives the appropriate value to TT1.Thenwe consider
our case, in which y =1,and obtain
-1+X-\l)2-= (1) (l-X)=1.
(B-5) IT11 — 2X 2XAppendix C
The purpose here is to provide some bibliographic evidence in support of
the interpretation of the real bills doctrine offered in footnote 19, namely,
as asserting that desirable behavior of the money supply will result if banks
(including the central bank) restrict their loans to the discounting of non-
speculative "real bills." Each of the following paragraphs will consist of
a brief passage quoted from the indicated source.
the error which it is the object of the present Chapter to expose;
namely, that of imagining that a proper limitation of bank notes may be
sufficiently secured by attending merely to the nature of the security for
which they are given (Thornton, 1802 t19781, p. 244).
We can only consider their ti.e., the banking school's] view of the
influence of bank credit, and more especially of note issues, on prices. This
school ...deniesany stch influence so long as the banks only grant credit to
the public in the form of loans on absolutely sound security. Even if the
banks are not compelled to redeem their notes in gold they cannot, says Tooke,
under such conditions either increase or diminish the total amount of credit
instruments in circulation (Wicksell, 1905 t19351, p. 173).
The anti-bullionists ...claimedthat as long as currency was issued only
by banks, and was issued by them only in the discount of genuine and sound
short-term commercial paper, it could not be issued in excess of the needs of
business, since no one would borrow at interest funds which he did not need
(Viner, 1937, p. 148).
if only "real" bills are discounted, the expansion of bank money will
be in proportion to ...the'needs of trade,' and ...,whentrade contracts,
bank loans will be correspondingly paid off. Closely associated with this point
of view is the doctrine that, if only commercial loans are made, the currencywill have a desirable elasticity and the banks will at all times be in a
liquid condition. I shall designate these ideas as the "real-bills doctrine"
(Mints, 1945, P. 9).
any continuing excess of note-issues above a safe figure was automatically
prevented ...tprovidedthat] notes were issued only against sound commercial
discounts.... The discounting of real trade bills could not lead to an over-
issue of paper (Horsefield, 1953, pp. 16, 26).
It was alleged tby the real bills doctrine] that the quantity of money
would automatically be properly regulated if the monetary authorities ensured
that banks always had enough reserves to meet the demand for loans intended to
finance "real" (as opposed to "speculative") investments at an interest rate
set "with a view of accommodating commerce and business" (Sargent, 1979, p. 92).Re fere aces
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1. The distinction between "indeterminacy" and "non'uniqueness" will.
be discussed below.
2. A related line of argument was put forth earlier by Liviatan (1981)
and more recently by Dotsey and King (1983) and Goodfriend (1983).
Also relevant is the analysis in Sargent-Wallace (1982). Recent
papers concerning indeterminacy but bearing less directly on the
issues here considered include Begg and Hague (1983), Calvo (1981),
and Carison (1983).
3. The terminology proposed in this paragraph is not currently used by
all writers, but is consistent with the usage of Sargent and Wallace
(who have contributed leading papers on both topics).
4. Actually, this specification differs in one way from that in McCallum (1981):
agents base their expectations of the future price level on r as
well as That change is not crucial for tie issues under
discussion, but should be kept in mind in obtaining solutions to the
various models. For additional discussion of the model, see McCallum (1981).
5. For an illustration of this phenomenon, see Appendix A.
6. Here and in all that follows it is taken for granted that the constant
state "variable" 1.0 is also included.
7.It will be noted that the values of 22 and in (11) would also be
small for large negative values of X and would approach zero for
Ourspecification does not, however, permit negative values of X.One
reason for this restriction is that X > C1 is necessary to rule out
"process inconsistency", in the language of Flood and Garber (1980), of
the type discussed in McCallum (1983a, pp. 159-160).
8. Suppose one were to adopt the other set of solutions to (17) and (18),
the =l/Xset that (according to Appendix 3) includes bubble
components. In this event it would be found that the coefficientsl2' l3' 22' arid ff23equal(for all X) the values obtained as
X —inthe model with policy rule (3). By itself, this finding
might lead one to believe that the procedure is picking the "wrong"
solution. ut it is also the case that the system requires that
=X(r-
b0)
to avoid an inconsistency, thereby restricting ).to
the value 1.0 if =r-
b0.Also, is not determinate. So this
solution is very poorly behaved.
9. Compare equations (20) in Goodfriend (1983).
10. Another change from the original model that will yield these qualitative
results is the inclusion of a real-balance term in the IS function,
provided that this term is written--as consideration of budget equations
suggests it should be--as mt-i -Pt(not -
'Li.This conclusion is also obtained by Goodfriend (1983) and by Dotsey
and King (1983).
12. We continue with the modified equations (1') and (2t), rather than
(1) and (2), for generality.
13. This is the set indicated by the procedural rule suggested in McCallum
(1983a) for cases with white-noise disturbances and no lagged expectations,
i.e., include only disturbances and predetermined variables that
explicitly appear in the equations of the model.
14. At an earlier stage, it was my belief that this notion was suggested
by the analysis of Barro and Gordon (1983, P. 595). That this is not
the case will become apparent shortly.
15.That oneis bound to meet some problem with rb0 is obvious from the
specificationof (26).16. It should be emphasized that this conclusion does not involve a
departure from the strategy of limiting our attention to solutions
with a minimal set of state variables (i.e., bubble-free solutions).
Instead, it reflects a conjecture that in the case at hand the
minimalsetof state variables includes aswell as Vand'Ti.
(Alternatively, could be used in place ofmi. The resulting
solution would be the same; i.e., the same paths would be generated
for the endogenous variables.)
17. In the language of Nelson and Plosser (1982), one of these processes
is, and the other is not, trend stationary.
18. The line of argument developed in this section can be applied to the
analysis on pp. 323-4 of McCallurn (1981).
19. It is not an entirely straightforward task to determine what thereal
bills doctrine, or commercial loan theory of credit, is.My impression--
formed on the basis of discussions by Blaug (1968),Humphrey (1982),
Horsefield (1953), Mints (1945), Thornton (1802), Viner(1937), and
Wicksell (1905)--is that the doctrine claims that desirable
behavior of the money supply will be assured if banks, including
the central bank, restrict their loans to the discounting of "real
bills," i.e., to the financing of non-speculative investments. (For
some supportive quotes, see Appendix C.) This version implies that
no quantitative restrictions on the stock of money need to be
imposed as a matter of policy, a situation represented by a policy
rule that focuses on interest rates rather thanany monetary
aggregate. In this paper, as in part I of S-W (1982), the discussion
presumes a fiat monetary standard.Some writers, includingAdam Smith, have espoused the real bills doctrine under the proviso
that the economy be on a commodity money standard, in which case no
issue of price level determinacy can arise. (For a discussion of
Smith's position, see Laidler (1981).)
20. Actually, Sargent and Wallace (1975) did not mention the real bills
doctrine. But Sargent (1982, p. 387) and Sargent-Wallace (1982, p. 1213)
have indicated that the 1975 results concerning an interest rate
policy rule should be interpreted as a criticism of the real-bills
doctrine.
21.WhethertheS-Wrepresentation of quantity-theory recommendations is
accurateis debatable, for reasons to be discussed below.
22.Thereis but one good, which is perishable.
23. In fact, the magnitude of monetary transfers to the old is zerofor
all t =1,2,...in the two S-W regimes that are of concern here.
It is nevertheless appropriate to write H(t) as a variable, thereby
reflectingthe possibility of other regimes and the possibility that
loan repayments will fluctuate over time.
24. Here there is no need to spell out the fluctuating endowment patterns
that are crucial for other aspects of the S-W discussion.
25. This heuristic interpretation of the equilibrium condition (42) applies
under the laissez faire regime. For an interpretation pertaining to
the real bills regime, see S-W (1982, p. 1226).
26. That is, equilibria in which currency has a positive value in terms
of goods.
27. Requiring this equalization of returns is implicitly to deny that
currency serves as a medium of exchange--or, more precisely,does so
to a greater extent than private securities--in the modelled economy.
It will be seen below that this condition necessitates some re-
interpretation of the present discussion.28. In this regime there are legal restrictions on private security
issues. Relation (43) nevertheless obtains in any monetary
equilibrium since all asset holders are free to hold government
currency (S-W, 1982, p. 1225).
29. This statement is also applicable, it should be noted, to the LFregime.
30. Laidler (1984) has presented other arguments suggesting that the
attempted rehabilitation is unsuccessful.
31. Recall fn. 19.
32. This conclusion is based on arguments developed in McCallum (l983b),
especially pp. 23-28 and 33-34, and McCallum (l983c).
33. Neglect of uncertainty and production is less fundamental in the
sense that much interesting monetary analysis can be, and has been,
conducted in non-stochastic models of exchange economies.
34. That this asset is said to carry a zero nominal interest rate is no
reason to think of it as currency. In fact, all this condition
implies is that the "nominal interest rate" has been computed from
its real rate by addition of the inflation rate with the price level
based on this asset as numeraire. But the own rate of interest on
any paper asset is always zeros
35. This conclusion obviously implies that the indeterminacy analysis in
the first part of this section must be reinterpreted as involving
a relative price.36. It is not universally agreed how Wicksell's (1898) (1905) ideas should be
expressed in terms of 1980's-style analysis. Thus Sargent and Wallace
refer to price level indeterminacy as "Wicksellian" (1982, p. 1213)
or as tttqjcsel1's indeterminacy" (1975, p. 215) while Laidler (1984)
contends that this is a misrepresentation, with Wicksellian phenomena
requiring some form of "disequilibrium." My own impression is that the
main aspect of Wicksell's analysis resides in the hypothesized tendency
for low nominal rates to lead to continuing inflation.
37.Forthe representation to be satisfactory, however, the price level
explosion would need to be in an upward direction when r is low andin
a downward direction when r is high.
38. On this point, see McCallum (1982).